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be taken by the British Government to find out: (1) whether it would be possile to induce the League of Nations (including the representative of China) unanimously to pass censure on the existing Government of Canton for its defiance of the treaties; (2) whether (in the event of the Canton Government ignoring such a censure) all the Powers would be willing to institute a boycott of Canton pending the removal of the anti-British boycott. His Majesty's Government might represent to the Powers that it is an unfriendly act for non-British shipping to avoid Hong Kong at the dictation of the Strike ('ommittee at Canton. In order to render the suggested action effective, special measures would have to be taken to prevent Russian and Chinese ships from trading with Canton. Steps should be taken to find out whether this task would be undertaken by the Chinese naval forces.
Arrangements for close liaison between Canton. Hong Kong and Peking were
made.
In view of the dearth of practical suggestions revealed at the Hong Kong meeting, and the increasing demands in this country that "something must be done,' a determined effort has been made by the Foreign Office further to review the situa tion.
The result has been an exchange of telegrams which will be found in Annex XVIII (Foreign Office to Peking. Nos. 30 and 35; Peking telegrams Nos. 39. 40 and 42: Canton telegram No. 5), and which may be summarised as follows -
Methods of Dealing with Canton.
(1.) Force, Sir R. Macleay says:—
L
War with Canton would imperil future trade relations between Great Britain and China would immediately lead to a fresh out burst of anti-British feeling all over China.'
Sir J. Jamieson says:---
+
As war would leave a legacy of hatred and might unite the rest of China, I deprecate it emphatically."
(2.) Blockade.—(a.) Independent action by ourselves; same objections as in case of (1), and besides it would entail friction with other Powers;
(b.) Joint international action based on clear infraction of articles I and 3 of Washington Nine-Power Treaty (see Annex XXI); Sir R Macleay doubts whether any Power (except perhaps France) would be ready to co-operate, and that such a proposal (if proceeded with) should be mooted in London and not in Peking. considers joint international action as the sole solution."
Sir J. Jamieson (3.) Assistance to an anti-Communist Chinese Leader.-This would be against our policy of non-intervention in Chinese affairs, and it is not encouraged by the incompetence of such leaders as Chen Ch'iung-ming. Sir J. Jamieson adds an unexpected observation that the present Government is (ie., in municipal matters, &c.) the best Kwangtung has ever had, and the introduction of others would lead to chaos. But the support (especially with arms and munitions) of a serious military leader like Wu Pei-fu in action against Canton should not be definitely excluded. (4.) Pressure on Moscow-This has been considered and rejected, since the only effective threat would be the withdrawal of the Moscow mission, and even that might not be successful (see also above p. 4 and Annex I). (5.) Conciliation.---Sir R. Macleay considers this is useless so long as the present anti-British Kuomintang faction is in power, openly directed and abetted by the Bolsheviks. We believe this to be so, so long as the Cantonese are getting more from the Russians than from us.
We have enquired whether Canton Government can be influenced by the moderate Kuomintang or by non-extremist Cantonese at Peking, Shanghai, &c. Sir R. Macleay has replied that such persong have no influence whatever with the faction now predominant in Kwangtung,
We have suggested that the Boxer Indemnity delegation should visit Canton and that a grant might be made out of indemnity funds which would offset Russian subsidies. Sir R. Macleay does not think such action would have any effect at present: Sir J. Jamieson is disposed to favour the offer of a grant, but doubts whether a visit from the delegation would be advisable.
• See, for instance, "Morning Post" of January 14, 1926, Annex XX.
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(6.) Appeal to the League of Nations, as suggested at Hong Kong meeting (see above, p. 11, also Annex XVII). We do not favour this as we feel sure that the League would not condemn Canton unanimously unheard, and that the hearing would provide a welcome opportunity for China to advertise its grievances on all manner of extraneous subjects. Young Further, as Sir R. Macleay points out, the Chinese representative on the League would never join in a resolution of censure, nor would such a censure have any effect on the Canton Bolsheviks; also, the attitude of the United States to the League would nullify any attempt at pressure by that body.
(7.) Patience. As Sir R Macleay states: The policy of patient conciliation
has borne abundant fruit in the restoration to a
great extent of friendship and goodwill between the British and Chinese peoples and resumption of normal commercial relations throughout China, except in a few areas, such as the Province of Kwangtung, which are controlled by external influences violently and openly hostile to Great Britain." Bolshevik prestige and influence, he says, have been severely shaken throughout China even in the eyes of Nationalist and student elements (by events in Manchuria, &c.). and we should wait developments of anti-Bolshevik feeling and the forma- tion of a coalition of friendly military leaders, who will probably, if and when they find themselves strong enough to do so. take action against Canton." (According to Hankow telegram No. 2 of the 1st February, Chiang Kai-shek-the leader of the Cadet army has already sent an offer of co-operation to Wu Pei-fu.) At the same time, we should indicate that our patience may in the end become exhausted, and we may be forced reluctantly into a change of policy.
The demands of Canton are:-
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(a.) The five demands (see p. 2 and Annex VII), which have now
apparently been shelved.
(b) The economic demands of the strikers (see pp. 8, 9).
(c.) The demand that the strikers have representatives of their own on the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, that extra-territoriality be abolished, and Shameen be handed back (see p. 9).
(d) The terms suggested by Mr. Sung to the Governor of Hong Kong (see Annex XVI) dealt with: (i) Inequality of treatment, freedom of meeting and speech; (ii) flogging by police; (iii) deportation from Hong Kong (iv) closing of Hong Kong unions; (v) representation of Chinese labour in Hong Kong legislature; (vi) strike pay; (vii) reinstatement of strikers.
(e) General Chiang Kai-shek's programme (see his speech after the recovery of Swatow in Peking despatch No. 882 of the 7th December) included: (i) abolition of all unequal treaties; (ii) prohibition of gambling and opium-smoking; (iii) resumption of control over Maritime Customs.
The Government of Hong Kong (see telegram in Annex XIX) do not believe that it is possible to negotiate a settlement with the present Canton Government, especially so long as the Russians are allowed to remain. They consider that not only the Washington Treaty, but the Treaties of Nanking and Tien-tsin (see Annex XXII) have been infringed; that it would be correct to regard the Canton Government as a rebel Government in insurrection against Peking; and that very strong pressure should be brought to bear on the representatives in London of the chief maritime Powers with a view to joint action.
Foreign Office, February 3, 1926.
F. ASHTON-GWATKIN.
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